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Abstract 
 
 The concept of internal control began in accounting professional groups, gradually 
expanded to the administrative control and the risk management from accounting control, 
and became an important area that cannot be excluded from the operation of the public 
companies in the U.S.  
 When the Enron scandal struck the credibility of the stock market in the U.S. in 
2001, the authorities implemented reformative measures including the SOX enactment to 
protect investors. Although there has been a controversy over this legislation since the 
enactment of the SOX, it appears that the U.S. capital market has been restoring confidence 
with the efforts of regulators. 
 Also, when the foreign exchange crisis and large-scale corporate accounting frauds 
occurred in Korea, there were demands that companies should establish internal control 
systems through legislations. However, the authorities in Korea tried to solve the problem 
by importing internal control system mainly from the U.S. and Japan since there was no 
various discussions of internal control for a long time. As a result, Korea individual 
legislations separately imported the internal control provisions from the U.S. and Japan, 
iii 
 
and they have contained illogical and cost increase problems. The most fundamental 
problem is that it is difficult to apply extensive concept of internal control like risk 
management to public companies that are not financial companies, because there is no 
general provision related the internal control in the Commercial Act, a general act for 
public companies. Next, cost problem companies are neglected to establish the internal 
control. Last, that is a conflict problem of internal control provisions in Korea legislations. 
 To solve these legislative problems, a general provision on internal control should 
be created in the Commercial Act. Second, it is necessary to approach companies with 
indirect regulation method like the U.S. and Japan to minimize the cost of establishment. 
Finally, it is required to integrate and operate internal control agencies that possibly cause 
confusion. Also, it is necessary to encourage companies to participate in establishing 
internal control system by implementing proper incentive systems rather than only 
imposing regulation. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
A. Background 
 The credibility of capital markets fell, and the stock price collapsed due to the 
Enron1 and World Com scandal2 in 2001. The Enron which reported $138.7 billion in 
revenues and placed the company at the seventh position on the Fortune Global 500 for the 
nine months of 2001,3 filed for bankruptcy protection in December of that year. It was 
revealed that 96% of the net income reported in 2000 was by accounting manipulation. The 
reason for this was the lack of supervision by the board of directors and independence of 
external auditors. Illegal acts within the Enron have broken at once the trust of the U.S. 
capital markets that boasted the world class level of transparency and fairness. After this 
case, the most innovative measure was taken to restore the credibility of the U.S. capital 
market with the consideration that the existing regulations were not capable of responding 
                                           
1  Choi, Joon-Sun, migug-ui gieobgaehyeogbeob - 2002nyeon-ui sabeinseu ogseullibeob [The U.S. 
Corporate Reform Act – Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002], 9(2) THE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE PRIVATE LAW 
507, 507-8 (Oct. 2002). The Enron scandal is a case in which the Enron quickly has grown into the world 
class energy company, but eventually went into bankruptcy with financial and lobbying activities, not normal 
business. The Enron reached more than $ 100 billion sales performance, and it became the U.S. 7 th largest 
company in 2000, but it went insolvent within a year. The company shift its debt and losses to subsidiaries, 
and it violated ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ (GAAP), using special purpose entities. The 
Enron’s stock price was US$ 90.75 per share in mid-2000, but plummeted to less than $1 by the end of Nov. 
2001. After the Enron’s bankruptcy, the company recorded the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history 
until WorldCom’s bankruptcy. 
           
2 The Guardian, WORLDCOM ACCOUNTING SCANDAL, 
 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/aug/09/corporatefraud.worldcom2 (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) 
(stating “An internal audit in WorldCom discovered that $3.3 billion in profits were improperly recorded on 
its books from 1999 to the first quarter of 2002”).   
3 Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001; Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, 
Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 97 (2008). 
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effectively to large accounting fraud. In this crisis, the most innovative reform legislation, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter “SOX”) was promulgated since the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which had played an important role 
as the fundamental legislations of the U.S. capital market. 
 Also, the Daewoo Group was forced to be dissolved by the court’s decisions, for 
excessively expanding its business in 1999. The Supreme Court found the chairman of the 
Daewoo Group, Kim, Woo-Choong was guilty for being involved in the fraudulent 
accounting of 41 trillion won [approximately $ 36.7 billion (1,115 won/1 U.S. dollar)].4 
After the financial crisis in 1997 and several fraudulent accounting scandals of 
conglomerates, various bills were introduced for the advancement of the accounting 
system. 
 Particularly, the Korea has prepared the revision of the individual bills by importing 
main provisions of SOX since the enactment of the act in the U.S.5 The general provisions 
for the internal control were not legislated to the Commercial law, a general law for public 
companies was individually imported to the various special laws in Korea although the 
                                           
4 OHMYNEWS, Daewoo bunsighoegye 50jo... 200eogdalleo haeoebimilgwanli [Daewoo Fraudulent 
accounting 50 trillion…$20 billion foreign secret management], 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000031666 (last visited Nov. 29, 
2017). The chairman Kim has been managing over $20 billions over the past three years through British 
Finance organization (BFC) established in London, the U.K.   
 
5 Suh, Hun Je, 2002nyeon migug gaeeobgaehyeogbeob-e daehan yeongu [A Study on the U.S. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002], 6(2) CHUNG-ANG L. REV. 161, 214-6 (July 2004). These reformative legislations were 
revised bills of the Securities and Exchange Act, the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, and the 
Certified Public Accountants Act. Particularly, the bills of the Securities and Exchange Act included the 
provisions related to the certification system of the CEO and other relevant officers, importing the Article 
302 and 906 of SOX. However, the opposite views were raised by public companies that the bill could be the 
burden to the CEO because financial statements were ultimately decided by the board, even if the CEO and 
other accounting officers could make them. 
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U.S. introduced the internal control system for public companies. In addition, the penal 
clauses of the Securities and Exchange Act of Korea were lighter than those of SOX, and 
had limitations as to the effectiveness of the law.6 
 
B. Purpose and Synopsis 
 The purpose of this study is to review the development of the internal control 
concept, the legislations amendments, and the relevant judicial precedents in the U.S. for 
the implication of the legislations related to the internal control in Korea. This Thesis 
consists of five parts.  
 Part Ⅱ begins with describing how the U.S. internal concept had begun and 
developed. In the process, I will review the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977(hereafter 
“FCPA”) and parts related to the internal control of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations prior to the SOX. It is necessary to examine how the internal control concept 
shaped and developed the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission reports (hereafter “COSO reports”) and how they had created modern internal 
control concepts. After that, I will explain main provisions related to the internal control of 
the SOX which has considered to be the most reformative legislation since the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the U.S.  After analyzing the 
                                           
6 Id. at 217. If management breaches the certification obligation, the defendants shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of $ 5 million under the SOX, but only imprisonment for 
not more than 5 years or less than a fine of 30 million won [$ 26,905 (1,115 won/ 1 U.S. dollar)] under the 
Securities Exchange Act of Korea. 
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relevant cases about the internal control obligations, I will write about how the courts had 
evaluated the duties of boards of directors on internal control. 
 In part Ⅲ, I will explain the main clauses and the problems of three legislations 
about the internal control system in Korea. Those are the internal accounting management 
regulations of the External Audit Act, the compliance officer of the Act on Corporate 
Governance of Financial Companies, and the compliance assistant of the Commercial Act. 
Comparing to the U.S. internal control system, I would like to point out the problems of 
the legislations of internal control in Korea. First, it is difficult to apply the concept of the 
internal control to public companies that are not financial companies because there is no a 
general provision on internal control in the Commercial Act as a general law for public 
companies. Next, I will describe the cost burden problems of companies to implement the 
internal control provisions. Even if the ideas of the internal control is positive, if the burden 
of public companies is ignored, the legislations will be subjective to formal administrative 
regulations, and it will be hard to expect substantial effect to the investors’ protection. 
Additionally, I will mention the conflict issues related to the internal control in Korea. 
Those are mainly about the works inefficiency and duplication problems such as the 
distinction problems between the compliance officer and the compliance supporter and the 
reporting issues of them.  
 In part Ⅳ, I will suggest several implications that the legislature can refer to make 
laws related to the internal control system in Korea. The internal control system had to 
relied on imports of the U.S. and Japanese legislations.  Issues in regards to this matter 
were not addressed and discussed until many years later unlike the laws in the U.S. 
- 5 - 
 
legislations.  As a result, there are a contradiction that the general provision for the internal 
control cannot applied to public companies that are not financial companies because the 
provision was not included in the Commercial Act. For that reason, the Commercial Act 
should include a general provision for the internal control system. To minimize the cost of 
implementing the internal control clauses, I will suggest my opinion as how to make the 
criteria of public companies to which the internal control provisions can be applied.  Also, 
I will mention which regulation approach can be more effective between direct and indirect 
method for the internal control. The last part will address the need for an appropriate 
incentive system to encourage public companies to voluntarily participate. The part Ⅴ will 
summarize the conclusion of this study. 
 
Ⅱ. Development and Current situation of Internal Control System in the U.S. 
A. The beginning of the concept of internal control 
Generally speaking, “Internal control serves as a first line of defense in 
safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud”.7 Historically, the term 
of internal control has been mainly used by the accounting professional groups and the 
accounting groups have used the term ambiguously as to the exact meaning and scope at 
                                           
7 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-361, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: CONSIDERATION OF 
KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, at 13 
(2006),  available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fassets%2F250%2F249736.pdf 
(last visited on October 17, 2017). 
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first. In 1949, the term of ‘internal control’ first emerged in a publication of the American 
Institute of Accountants, the predecessor of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (“AICPA”).8  
AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure published a special report titled 
「Internal Control: Elements of a Coordinated System and Its Importance to Management 
and The Independent Public Accountant」 to conceptualize internal control. The report 
defined internal control as “the plan of organization and all of the coordinate methods and 
measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and 
reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence 
to prescribed managerial policies.” 9  In other words, the accounting groups broadly 
recognized the definition of internal controls as beyond those matters which relate directly 
to the functions of the accountings from the outset. 
Afterward, these concepts distinguished between accounting controls that directly 
relate to the financial records and the safeguarding of assets and administrative controls by 
Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 29 in October 1958.10 Although the audit procedure 
                                           
8 Comm. on Law and Accounting, Management Reports on Internal Control: A Legal Perspective, 49 BUS. 
L. 889, 892, n 13 (Feb. 1994). 
9  AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS. COMMITTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE, 
INTERNAL CONTROL: ELEMENTS OF A COORDINATED SYSTEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO MANAGEMENT AND THE 
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, special report, 6 (1949); Peter Ferola, Internal Control in the Aftermath 
of Sarbanes-Oxley: One Size doesn’t Fit All, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006). 
10 THE COMMITTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE OF THE AICPA, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE NO. 
29: SCOPE OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REVIEW OF INTERNAL CONTROL 36 (1958) (stating that 
“accounting controls generally include the systems of authorization and approval, separation of duties 
concerned with record keeping and accounting reports. On the other hand, Administrative controls generally 
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might be classified as accounting controls and administrative controls and the auditor’s 
responsibilities are basically limited to accounting controls, the control methods could vary 
depending on individual circumstances. For example, if the auditor believes that certain 
administrative controls affect the financial records, he could consider the need of such 
controls.11 
However, Because the term of internal control has been approached beyond the 
accounting functions of a company, and accounting groups have ambiguously used the 
term, there was a limitation that prevented from successfully defying the term. After that, 
there has been several attempts to distinguish between the accounting controls and 
administrative controls. The AICPA formally abandoned the efforts in 1988.12 
 
B. Introduction of internal control regulation by public agencies. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (1977) 
 Basically, private organizations mainly have discussed problems of the internal 
control because they were the discretion of enterprise’s management to decide whether to 
establish internal control systems within the organizations for business purposes. However, 
the FCPA which was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1977 enacted the first public 
                                           
include statistical analyses, time and motion studies, performance reports, employee training programs, and 
quality controls.” 
11 Id. at 37. 
12 Id. 
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regulations on the U.S. internal controls.13  
 The FCPA was originally triggered by the Watergate scandal, 14  and the SEC 
investigation discovered over $300 million of questionable payments by U.S. companies 
to foreign government officials. 15  Subsequently, the SEC began investigations, and 
proposed an autonomous disclosure program in which companies could report suspicious 
internal and external payments or accounting practices to the SEC on March 8, 1974. As a 
result, approximately 360 companies reported their funding and accounting practices until 
March 1977, and eventually about 400 companies participated in the program. After the 
SEC’s investigation, it was revealed that unlawful payments required secret funds based 
on accounting fraud and inappropriate accounting books and records. Therefore, the FCPA 
adopted two approaches to counter bribery, which were accounting provisions and anti-
bribery provisions. 16  The accounting provisions focus on disclosure. It requires all 
companies registered with the SEC to keep accounts of all transactions, and establish an 
                                           
13 Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption – The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 83, 84 (2007). The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, also, was the first legislation 
in the world to recognize and seek to curb the contribution of domestic corporations to foreign corruptions. 
After that, the FCPA was incorporated into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
14 Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – The Federalization 
of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (Nov. 1979). (stating that “when the 
Watergate investigation uncovered instances of the covert use of corporate funds for illegal corporate political 
contributions, the SEC began to consider whether the concealment of these contributions violated the 
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.”) 
15 Krever, supra note 14, at 87. The 527 companies, the SEC report listed, were major U.S. corporations such 
as Exxon Mobile, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Gulf Oil. 
16 Id.  
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internal accounting control system. 17  The anti-bribery provisions prohibit the U.S. 
companies from making payments to foreign officials for her help to retain business.18 
 
2. The United States Sentencing Commission (1991) 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission announced the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations, which provide an effective compliance and ethics program, in 1991.19 It 
                                           
17 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) - (B) (2000). 
(2) Every [SEC-reporting] issuer… shall… 
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and 
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurances that – 
(ⅰ) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; 
(ⅱ) transactions are recorded as necessary (Ⅰ) to permit preparation of financial statements in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such 
statements, and (Ⅱ) to maintain accountability for assets; 
(ⅲ) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific 
authorization; and 
(ⅳ) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable 
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.  
18 Id. 
19 Johanna Pitcairn, “Corporate Compliance and Executive Compensation since the AIG Scandal”, 82 
N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 35, 36 (2010).  
According to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Compliance officers rely on the seven steps of the 
Guidelines to implement an effective compliance program. 
1. Set up standards and procedures to prevent and detect non-compliance with the regulatory 
scheme. 
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was the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent organization in the federal judiciary 
that declared a sentence guideline for organizations.  
The main content was that punishment could be reduced if companies effectively 
establish an internal control system that can prevent and detect criminal conducts, even if 
the firms violate the laws.20 Specifically, if a company reports to relevant authorities within 
a reasonable period, actively cooperates with the investigation, and expressly 
acknowledges the responsibility for the criminal conducts, punishment can be significantly 
reduced. Internal control system including a compliance program was required to quickly 
report to the authorities. It could be evaluated that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations provided incentives for establishment of internal control system within the 
                                           
2. Top management and the board must play a proactive role in overseeing the program. 
3. Eliminate individuals with authority whose prior conduct is inconsistent with strict 
compliance standards. 
4. Communicate standards and procedures effectively among directors and officers. 
5. Monitor and audit the compliance program periodically and maintain an effective system for 
reporting non-compliance. 
6. Enforce the program through effective incentives and establish appropriate disciplinary 
procedures to deal with non-compliance, including compensation reduction. 
7. If non-compliance is discovered, take reasonable and prompt steps to avoid future problems, 
including modifying the compliance program, as needed. 
20 Id. at 37. The U.S. Supreme Court held that “if a company has an anti-harassment compliance policy and 
procedure in place, and an employee fails to use them to report harassing behavior, the employer can present 
the compliance program as an affirmative defense to a hostile work environment claim.” in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
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organizations.21 The Guidelines created a new position, the Ethics & Compliance officer, 
and spurred companies to improve existing compliance programs or create new compliance 
programs.22 
 
C. The Formulation of Internal Control Concept 
1. Treadway commission (1992) 
One of the institutions that played a major role in establishing the concept of 
internal control in the U.S. was the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (hereafter “COSO”) under the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (hereafter “Treadway Commission). The COSO published the report 
of the Treadway Commission to identify the causes of fraudulent financial reporting, and 
review measures to deter its occurrence, with the cooperation of American Institute of 
CPAs, American Accounting Association, Financial Executive International, Institute of 
Internal Auditors, and National Association of Accountants in 1980s. 
After that, the COSO reviewed the corporate structure, not limited to financial 
reporting, to prevent and rectify frauds within the organizations, and published a final 
                                           
21 Yang, Man-Sig, Isaui naebutongjesiseutem-ui guchugchaeg-imgwa hyeonsang-e gwanhan yeongu [A 
Study on Responsibilities and Current States of the internal Control], 25(1) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 249, 
252-3 (2011). 
 
22 Yook, Tae-woo, Migug-eseoui gieob keompeullaieonseuui baljeon- jedojeog jinhwagwajeong mich 
choegeun-ui panlyebeobsang-ui jeog-yong [Development of Corporate Compliance in the United States – 
Evolving Process of the System and Its Application to Case Laws], 39 KANGWON LAW REVIEW, 134, 140 
(2013). 
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report on how to define the concept of the internal control and the evaluation standard in 
1992. This report is the “Internal Control-Integrated Framework” (the COSO report of 
1992) that comprehensively defines and describes the internal controls.  
 
2. COSO Report (1992, 2004, 2013) 
ⅰ. The definition of Terms for the Internal control (COSO of 1992)  
 The COSO report of 1992 describes that the concept of internal control is a 
reasonable process implemented by a board of directors, management and other employees 
to achieve three objectives that are ① effectiveness and efficiency of operations, ② 
reliability of financial reporting, ③ compliance with applicable laws and regulations.23 In 
order to achieve the above three objectives, the report explains that it is necessary for five 
elements to be worked organically. The five elements are ① Control environment 
(integrity, ethical values and abilities, management philosophy and behavior style, etc.), 
② Risk assessment (duties to identify and analyze risks related goals achievement), ③ 
Control Activities (policies and procedures to ensure that management orders are 
implemented), ④ Information and communication systems, ⑤ Monitoring.24 
According to the report, the purpose of establishing internal control is to achieve 
                                           
23 COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 9 (1992). 
24 Id. 
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the above three objectives that are effectiveness and efficiency of business activities, 
reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with related laws and regulations. In other 
words, the central task of internal control is to comply with laws and regulations to attain 
management objectives of a company effectively and efficiently, and as a result, the 
appropriateness of financial reporting is needed. Also, the subject to accomplish these goals 
should be management, and the obligation to monitor and improve their effectiveness 
continuously is also a part of management. Eventually, the concrete way to achieve the 
management goals depends on the management’s own discretion.25 Since then, the internal 
control concept in the COSO report of 1992 has been accepted by the SOX in 2002, which 
has also affected legislations in other countries, including Korea and Japan. 
 
ⅱ. Integrated Framework as Risk Management (COSO of 2004) 
In the COSO report of 2004, the concept of internal control has been described in 
‘the Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, integrating the concept in the 
SOX report of 2002. In other words, it was clearly declared that the internal control was a 
system to effectively manage the entire risks of company’s business activities as a premise 
of management activities.  
The reason to release the COSO report of 2004 was that it required the 
maintenance of an internal control management system beyond the SOX.  Namely, it was 
                                           
25 Yook, Tae-woo, Migug ilbon dog-il-eseoui gieob keompeullaieonseu gaenyeom mich jedoui baljeongwa 
uli beobjee daehan sisajeom [Development of Definition and System of Corporate Compliance in USA, 
Japan, and Germany and Its Implications on Korean Legal System], Gyeong-yeongbeoblyul [Business Law], 
369 (2017). 
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not guarantee the success of the business, and it was required new risk management system 
to achieve business goals properly according to the COSO report of 2004. Therefore, risk 
management was required as the next step, based on the completeness of reporting under 
the SOX.26 
The COSO report of 2004 defines Enterprise risk management (hereafter “ERM”) 
as follows.  
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.27  
 
 Enterprise risk management structure consists of ① Strategic (high-level 
goals, aligned with and supporting its mission), ② Operation (effective and 
efficient use of its resources), ③ Reporting (reliability of reporting), ④ 
Compliance (compliance with applicable laws and regulations).28 
 
                                           
26 Son, Young Hoa, Naebutongjewa junbeobjiwon-injedo [Internal Control and Compliance System in 
Korea], 60 Seonjinsangsabeoblyul-yeongu [ADVANCED COMMERCIAL LAW RESEARCH], 151 (2012). 
27  COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2 (Sep. 2004), available at 
https://www.coso.org/Pages/erm-integratedframework.aspx (last visited on November 1, 2017).  
28 Id. at 3. 
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 There are several differences between the internal control in COSO of 2002 and the 
Enterprise risk management in COSO of 2004 as follows. First, the concept of internal 
control in the COSO of 1992 had three objectives, but the strategy perspective was added 
and had precedence over the other three objectives in the COSO report of 2004. Next, 
although the internal control integration structure had three components, it expanded to 
eight components in the report of 2004. The enterprise risk management in 2004, also, 
included the integrated structure of internal control in the report of 1992, and described 
that the internal control-integrated structure was an indispensable element as a part of the 
enterprise risk management. As a result, the enterprise risk management expanded and 
refined the components of internal control described in COSO report of 1992.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
29 Chung, Dae, Geullobeol seutaendeodeuloseoui naebutongje – sangjanghoesaui junbeobjiwon-injedo [A 
Study on Internal Control as a Global Standard: Compliance Officer System of Publicly Held Corporation], 
43 L. REV., 267, 272 (Aug. 2011). 
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Figure 1. THE COSO FRAMEWORK IN THE COSO REPORT OF 200430 
              
 
ⅲ. Ensuring the Reliability of Non-Financial Reports (COSO of 2013)  
The COSO has reviewed its internal control, and has published an updated version 
of 2004 report in 2013 (hereafter “COSO report of 2013) after conducting an international 
online survey in November 2011. The COSO of 2013 expanded the scope of financial 
reporting and supplemented unclear or abstract parts, complementing the internal control 
concept in the COSO report of 1992.31 
 The COSO report of 2013 defined “internal control as a process, effected by board 
of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
                                           
30 COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 5.  
31 Park, Sei-Hwa, Naebutongjee gwanhan hangug gieobbeobje-ui hyeonhwang-gwa gwaje [The Current 
Situation and Prospect of Internal Control System in Korean Corporate Laws], 30(1) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 
39, 41 (2015). 
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regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and 
compliance.”32  
 There are similarities in the concept of internal control of between the COSO report 
of 1992 and 2013, nevertheless there are multiple differences and they are as follow:  First, 
the term, reliability of financial reporting in the purpose of internal control in the COSO 
report of 1992 was changed to reliability of reporting. The reason is that it is necessary to 
secure the reliability of the entire reports including the disclosure of non-financial 
information such as a CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) report and a Sustainability 
report. The monitoring, also, which was one among the five internal control components 
in the COSO report of 1992, was changed to ‘monitoring activities’ to prevent the 
component from concentrating only on the control itself.33 Next, although the COSO report 
of 1992 used the existing departmental units and the entire company as an organizational 
unit, the COSO report of 2014 had internal control implemented by each unit, clarifying 
roles and responsibilities of functional units, operational units, business units, and 
subsidiary companies. Additionally, the COSO report of 2014 considered the governance 
structure of the audit committee, the compensation committee, and the executive 
recommendation committee besides the board of directors. Above all, the most significant 
                                           
32 COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL – 
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 3 (May 2013), available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fna.theiia.org%2Fstandards-
guidance%2Ftopics%2FDocuments%2FExecutive_Summary.pdf (last visited on November 21, 2017). 
33 Id. at 4. (stating “Control activities are performed at all levels of the entity, at various stages within 
business processes, and over the technology environment. They may be preventive or detective in nature 
and may encompass a range manual and automated activities such as authorizations and approvals, 
verifications, reconciliations…”). 
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feature of the COSO report of 2013 is to provides only a minimal set of principles for the 
internal control, and to gives the discretion to companies to customize it.34 
 
D. The legislation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
1. The Overview of SOX of 2002 
The internal control concept of the COSO report of 1992 was reflected by the SOX 
in 2002, which affected the regulation for public companies of other countries including 
Korea and Japan. The SOX which had been enacted in July 2002 after the Enron scandal 
in 2001, required a complicated compliance structure for public companies. The SOX dealt 
with the independence of auditors, the responsibilities of public companies, the 
improvement of internal control, and the enhancement of financial disclosure provisions. 
Under the Act, a powerful and independent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) has been established to deal with corporate scandals, and to oversee audits of 
public companies which are applied to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.35 
The SOX prohibited the auditors from conducting works affecting the audits to 
avoid the conflict of interest, and tried to prevent companies from committing fraudulent 
acts by provisions related to whistleblowers, and strengthened the penalties for company 
frauds. 
                                           
34 Suh, Wan Suk, Gieob-ui naebutongje hwalseonghwa bang-on [The Revitalization Plan of Corporation’s 
Internal Control System], 43 Beobhag-yeongu [LAW REVIEW] 27, 45-7 (2015). 
 
35 Yook, supra note 22, 142-6. 
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The SOX, also, strengthened corporate disclosure system to protect investors. 
Management was held responsible for establishing internal control system and evaluating 
the effectiveness of the system. The auditors were liable to attest the evaluation of 
management, and had the obligation to report the results to the Audit Committee. The 
public companies should disclose any significant changes in the financial statements 
including non-financial statements.  
 
2. Main provisions of the SOX 
ⅰ. Procedures for Complaints under Audit Committee (Section 301) 
 It is effective to establish procedures for complaints in which employees of public 
companies can raise problems regarding unlawful behaviors.36 Generally, it is difficult to 
detect illegal acts such as forgery or embezzlement that occur in the business before internal 
staff report misconducts. There is consistent evaluation that it is effective to establish 
internal reporting system to deter frauds, which are increasingly intelligent and 
confidential.37 In the U.S., Whistle-blowers in the federal governments were first protected 
in the 1970s. The SOX obligated the Audit Committee of listed companies to establish 
anonymous procedures for complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, 
or audit matters.38 If a whistle-blower, also, reasonably believed that there is a violation of 
                                           
36 Park, supra note 31, at 58. 
 
37 Id. 
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). “(4) Complaints. - Each audit committee 
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federal law that regulates fraudulent behaviors related to Finance, Securities, and 
Shareholders, he could be legally protected.39 
 
ⅱ. Certification responsibility of CEO and other financial officers (Section 302) 
 The principal executive officer’s certification requirements of the SOX section 
302(a) are mainly related to internal control through disclosure regulations. In other words, 
principal executive officers, principal financial officers, and other officers should certify 
specific matters in the company’s periodic reports which is submitted to the SEC under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 13(a) or 15(d).40 The relevant officers should 
certify that the financial statements and other financial information fairly present the 
financial condition and operation of the company.41 The officers should disclose to the 
auditors and the audit committee all significant deficiencies in the operation of internal 
                                           
shall establish procedures for-- (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” 
39 Id. § 806. “Remedies --(1) In general - An employee prevailing in any action under subsection (b)(1) 
shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. (2) Compensatory damages - Relief for 
any action…” 
 
40 Id. § 302(a) 
41 Id. § 302(a)(3). Also, according to the SOX § 302(a)(4), (stating “the executive officers are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining internal controls, have designed such internal controls, and have evaluated the 
effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls, and have presented in the report their conclusions about the 
effectiveness of their internal controls.”) 
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control and any fraud that involves management.42   
 Also, the signing officers should specify and certify in their periodic reports 
whether there has been a material change and other factors that could significantly affect 
the internal control system after the evaluation date.43 
 
ⅲ. Management Assessment of Internal Control (Section 404) 
Management should evaluate the changes in the internal control system of a 
company that materially impacts or is reasonably expected to impact on the financial 
reporting. In other words, annual report should include internal control report under the 
SOX section 404. An internal control report should prescribe ① the responsibility of 
management to establish and manage an adequate internal control structure and procedures 
for financial reporting, and ② an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the company.44 Also, each public 
accounting firm which issues the audit reporter for the company should attests to the 
assessment made by the management.45 
 
                                           
42 Id. § 302(a)(5). 
43 Id. § 302(a)(6). 
44 Id. § 404(a). 
45 Id. § 404(b). 
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ⅳ. Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers (Section 406) 
 According to the SOX, the definition of code of ethics is standards to promote “① 
honest and ethical conduct, ② full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in 
periodic reports, and ③ compliance with applicable governmental regulations.”46 The 
SOX requires a public company to disclose whether the company had adopted a code of 
ethics for senior financial officers and persons performing similar functions.47 If a public 
company does not disclose the adoption of the code of ethics, the company should disclose 
the reason for not disclosing it.48 
 
3. Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
ⅰ. Positive Effect 
 First, it is evaluated that the SOX pursues the effectiveness of accounting provisions 
by a certification of signing executive officers and other officers who perform similar 
functions.49 Under the SOX, the principal executive and financial officers should certify 
that “the financial statements and other financial information in the report fairly present the 
financial condition and result of operation of the company for the periods presented in the 
                                           
46 Id. section 406(c). 
47 Id. section 406(a). 
48 Id. 
49 Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 245 (2003). 
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report.”50 If whoever willfully certifies an inadequate report, he or she “shall be fined not 
more than $ 5,000,000 or imprisonment not more than 20 years, or both.”51  
 It is also positive that internal control system is included in the certification to 
supplement the provision. This clause not only requires the CEO to certify whether there 
is a wrongdoing, but is also a guaranteed device that can make him find the wrongdoer. 
Signing officers should assure the flow of financial information, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of internal control system within ninety days prior to the publication of the 
reports, establishing the system.52 The Corporate law status did not enforce the internal 
control system prior to the SOX, however, it evaluated that the SOX establish a standard 
for its effectiveness.53  
 Additionally, The SOX has enforced the quality and independence of the audit 
function by assuring more autonomy of the audit committee.54 According to the SOX, the 
audit committee can hire any registered public accounting firm, oversee the work, receive 
audit reports, and hold directly responsible for contents of the reports.55 The SOX prohibits 
the use of non-audit business which can affect the audit from public accounting firms to 
                                           
50 Id. § 302(a)(2). 
51 Id. § 906(c)(2). 
52 Kim, supra note 49, at 247. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 242. 
55 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 38, § 301(2). 
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strengthen the independence of auditors.56 
 
ⅱ. Negative Effect 
 According to Bob Greifeld, “foreign IPO candidates are now reluctant to consider 
the U.S. capital market as result of SOX compliance issues.” 57 He claims that 
“approximately 90% of international small companies intending to go public are choosing 
to list abroad because of SOX costs and concerns.”58 According to the GAO report, many 
public companies are going private. For example, the number of companies going private 
increased drastically from 143 in 2001 to 245 in 2004 (see figure 2).59 Even though these 
numbers are a small percentage of entire public companies, the trends explain that more 
                                           
56 Id. § 201(g).  
Prohibited Activities  (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements of the audit client; (2) financial information systems design and 
implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind 
reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions 
or human resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; 
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other service that the 
Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
57 Peter Ferola, “Internal Controls in The Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One size doesn’t fit all”, 48 S. 
Tex. L. Rev. 87, 112 (2006-2007) 
58 Bob Greifeld, It’s Time to pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006 at A14; cited in Peter Ferola, 
“Internal Controls in The Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One size doesn’t fit all”, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87, 
112 (2006-2007). 
59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 7 at 76. 
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small companies are reconsidering the cost and benefits of keeping public.60 
 Why did small companies go private? Many companies mentioned both the direct 
and the indirect costs of maintaining their public company status. After the SOX enactment, 
the companies needed more the direct cost that were the accounting and legal fees and the 
indirect cost like the time to comply with SEC’s reporting requirements.61 The Table 1 
shows that the direct cost increased to 62.2% in 2005 from 12.3% in 1998, and the indirect 
cost also increased to 28.9% in 2005 from 5.3% in 1998. Therefore, it can be presumed 
that cost considerations like direct and indirect costs were the leading reasons for the small 
companies exiting the public market. 
Figure 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES IDENTIFIED AS GOING PRIVATE FROM 1998 
TO 200562 
 
                                           
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 22 
62 Id. at 77. 
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Table 1. Primary Reasons Cited by Companies for Going Private (1998-2005)63 
 
 
E. Relevant Cases of Internal Control System 
1. Caremark case 
 The Caremark case 64  of the Delaware court in 1996 concerns the director’s 
obligation for the company’s compliance and ethics program. In this case, the court decided 
that there was no fault or negligence on the supervisory obligation of the board of directors 
because there was no ground that the company’s board lacked their duty of care or 
                                           
63 Id. at 23. 
64 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 261-2 
(1997). The facts of the case were that “Caremark entered into various agreements with health-care providers, 
including consultation agreements with, and research grants to, physicians. At least some of these physicians 
prescribed or recommended Caremark services or products to Medicare recipients and other patients. Based 
on these agreements and grants, Caremark was indicted for violating APRL.” 
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knowingly connived the violation of the company rules.65 Instead, the supervisory duties 
of the board were deemed to have met if the board of directors had worked to establish a 
compliance program as a good manager.66  
 
2. Stone case 
The Delaware Supreme Court expressly approved the so-called Caremark 
doctrine, which was on the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization and 
monitoring of the enterprise through the Stone case. The Stone case made it clear that the 
duty of care in the Caremark was the part of the fiduciary duty of the directors,67 and it was 
needed to prove “knowing violation of statute” in order to ask for the responsibility of the 
director.  
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicted for 
director to oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any 
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a 
system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
                                           
65 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 956 (Del. Ch. 1996) at 972. 
66 Id. at 972. 
67  CHARLES R.T. O’KELLERY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS CASE AND MATERIALS 374 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014). (stating “the Caremark 
standard for so-called “oversight” liability draws heavily upon the concept of director failure to act in good 
faith.”) 
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attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the 
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligation.  Directors 
fail to act in the face of a known duty act, they demonstrated a conscious disregard 
for their responsibilities, by breaching their duty of loyalty and by failing to 
discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.68 
 
Ⅲ. Current internal system and Problems in Korea 
A. Status and Analysis of Legislation on Internal Control in Korea 
 
 Conglomerates in Korea have been demanded transparency and soundness of 
corporate management from overseas investors since the IMF financial crisis. 69 
Specifically, much interests were concentrated on securing transparency of accounting 
areas as accounting fraud cases in the U.S. and fraud incidents involving Japanese financial 
institutions. As a result, it became compulsory for a list of companies to be more 
transparent in regards of assets and to establish an internal control system by executive 
orders. The internal control system under the legislations of Korea is that ① Internal 
                                           
68 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) at 370. 
69 Korean Law via the Internet, IMF Crisis, 
http://www.koreanlii.or.kr/w/index.php/IMF_Crisis?ckattempt=1  
(last visited on Nov. 29, 2017) (stating “IMF Crisis means the financial crisis experienced by Korean 
people in the late 1990s, which was caused by the severe foreign exchange shortage on the brink of default 
of South Korea in December 1997, and bailed out by the IMF Standby Credit Facility and other 
international financial supports.”) 
- 29 - 
 
Accounting Management System of Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (hereafter 
“External Audit Act), ② Compliance Officer of Act on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies (hereafter “Financial Company Governance Act”), and ③ Compliance 
Supporter of Commercial Act.70 
Table 2. THE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE KOREAN LEGISLATIONS71 
Internal Control Purpose Target Companies Legislations 
Internal Accounting 
Management 
System 
 
Accounting Control 
 
Public companies with assets 
of more than 100 billion won 
External Audit 
Act 
 
Compliance Officer 
 
Administrative Control 
including Compliance 
Control 
 
Financial companies 
including banks, insurance 
companies, etc. 
Financial  
Company 
Governance 
Act 
 
Compliance 
Assistant 
 
Compliance Control 
 
Public companies with assets 
of more than 500 billion won 
 
Commercial 
Act 
 
1. Internal Accounting Management System of External Audit Act 
 A compliance system, the Internal Accounting Management System, was first 
enacted in the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act as a temporary statute (2001. 9. 15 
                                           
70 Kwon, Jong-Ho, Gieobnaebutongjejedoui balamjighan ibbeobbanghyang [The Proper Direction of 
Legislation on the Internal Control System], 25(4) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 127, 137 (2011). 
 
71 Chung, supra note 29, at 288. If 1 U.S. dollar can be converted to 1,115 won (Korean currency unit), 100 
billion won is approximately $ 89,686,098, and 500 billion is about $ 448,430,493. 
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– 2005. 12. 31) by the influence of the SOX of the U.S. in 2001. Thereafter, the compliance 
system was transferred to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (hereafter 
“External Audit Act”).72 
 The External Audit Act is a law that sets out the matters necessary for the 
accounting of the company under the audit of the external auditor.73 It is stipulated that the 
internal accounting management regulations and the internal accounting management 
system should be established for the preparation and public notice of reliable accounting 
information under the Article 8(1) of the External Auditing Act.74 However, privately held 
                                           
72 Yang, supra note 21, at 262. The Ministry of Planning and Economy submitted to the Congress a bill of 
the Securities Transactions Act, the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, and the Certified Public 
Accountant Act in June 2002, and they were passed in the Congress in December 2003. 
 
73 Jusighoesa deung-ui oebugamsa-e gwanhan beoblyul [Act on External Audit of Stock Companies], Act 
No. 3297, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act. No. 15022, Oct. 31, 2017, art. 1 (S. Kor.). “The purpose of this 
Act is to protect interested persons and to contribute to the sound growth of companies by ensuring 
appropriateness of accounting through obliging a stock company to be audited by an external auditor who is 
independent of such company”. 
 
74 Id. art. 8(1) (Operation, etc. of Internal Accounting Management System) 
(1) Any company (excluding a company other than a stock-listed corporation, whose total amount 
of assets is less than 100 billion won at the end of the immediately preceding business year; 
hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) shall have internal accounting management 
regulations which include the following matters and shall have the system to manage and 
operate them (hereinafter referred to as "internal accounting management system") for the 
preparation and public notice of reliable accounting information: 
1. Matters concerning the method of identification, mensuration, classification, recording and 
reporting of accounting information (including transaction related information which forms the 
basis for accounting information; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article); 
2. Matters concerning the method of controlling the errors of accounting information and revising 
them; 
3. Matters concerning the internal verification, such as a regular inspection and adjustment, etc. 
of accounting information; 
4. Matters concerning the method of managing books to record and keep accounting information 
(including magnetic tapes, diskettes and other information storage devices) and the controlling 
procedures to prevent forgery, alteration, damage, or destruction; 
5. Matters concerning the segregation of duties and responsibilities of the executives and 
employees related to the preparation and public notice of accounting information; 
6. Other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree which are necessary for the preparation and 
public notice of reliable accounting information. 
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companies whose total amount of asset is less than 100 billion won at the end of the 
immediately preceding business year are exempted from this application. 75  The 
representative of a company shall assume the responsibility for the management and 
operation of the internal accounting management system and appoints one full-time 
director who is appointed as the internal accounting manager.76 Also, the representative of 
the company has an obligation to report the operating status of the internal accounting 
control system to the shareholder, the board of directors, and the audit committee every 
business year.77 
 An external auditor who reviews a stock company’s report on the current 
operational status of its internal accounting management system, shall examine whether 
the internal accounting management system has been designed and operated properly, 
through inquiries to relevant executives and employees verification of relevant documents, 
and inspection of the current operational status of the internal control.78 A list of stock 
companies shall publish matters concerning its internal accounting management system, as 
prescribed by the Financial Services Commission.79 
                                           
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. art. 8(3) 
77 Id. art. 8(4) 
78 Jusighoesaui oebugamsa-e gwanhan beoblyulsihaenglyeong [Enforcement Decree of the Act on External 
Audit of Stock Companies] Presidential Decree No. 10453, Sep. 3, 1981, amended by Presidential Decree 
No. 28041, May 8, 2017Art. 2-3(4) (S. Kor.). 
79 Id. Art. 2-3(3) 
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Table 3. MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN INTERNAL ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT 
REGULATIONS80 
1. Matters concerning the method of identification, mensuration, classification, recording and 
reporting of accounting information (including transaction related information which forms 
the basis for accounting information; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article); 
2. Matters concerning the method of controlling the errors of accounting information and 
revising them; 
3. Matters concerning the internal verification, such as a regular inspection and adjustment, etc. 
of accounting information; 
4. Matters concerning the method of managing books to record and keep accounting 
information (including magnetic tapes, diskettes and other information storage devices) and 
the controlling procedures to prevent forgery, alteration, damage, or destruction; 
5. Matters concerning the segregation of duties and responsibilities of the executives and 
employees related to the preparation and public notice of accounting information; 
6. Other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree which are necessary for the preparation and 
public notice of reliable accounting information. 
2. Compliance Officer of Financial Company Governance Act 
The purpose of Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies (hereafter 
“Financial Company Governance Act”) which was enacted on August 1, 2016, is to protect 
depositors, investors, policyholders, and other financial consumers by regulating the 
qualifications of financial company executives, the composition, and operation of the board 
                                           
80 Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, supra note 73, Art. 2-2(1). 
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of directors.81 Financial companies shall have establish internal control standards, and have 
at least one compliance officer to report to the Audit Committee or Auditor under the 
Financial Company Governance Act. 82  Also, the companies shall establish the risk 
management committee as a committee within the board of directors,83 and have at least 
one risk manager to examine and manage risks incurred in business affairs and other 
various transactions.84 
Specifically, the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Corporate Governance of 
Financial Companies article 19 sets forth matters to be included in the internal control 
standards so that internal control can be effectively implemented. Matters which should be 
included in the internal control standard are as follows. 
 
Table 4. MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE INTERNAL CONTROL STANDARD85 
                                           
81 Geum-yunghoesaui jibaegujo-e gwanhan beoblyul [Act of Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies] Act No. 13453, July 31, 2015, amended by Act. No. 14818, April 18, 2017 Art. 1 (S. Kor.). 
82 Id. art. 25 
83 Id. art. 16 
84 Id. art. 28 
85 Geum-yunghoesa jibaegujo-e gwanhan beoblyul sihaenglyeong [Enforcement Decree of the Act on 
Corporate Governance of Financial Companies] Presidential Decree No. 27414, July 28, 2016, amended by 
Presidential Decree No. 28391, Oct. 17, 2017 Art. 19 (S. Kor.). 
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1. Job allocation and organizational structure; 
2. The procedure that executive officers and employees shall observe in performing their duties; 
3. The roles that the board of directors, executive officers, and compliance officers shall serve 
in connection with internal control; 
4. Human resources and support organizations with expertise in performance of internal 
control; 
5. Establishment of a system that can efficiently convey information necessary for making 
decisions on business management; 
6. The procedure and method for ascertaining whether executive officers and employees 
observe the internal control standards and measures to be taken against executive officers 
and employees who breach the internal control standards; 
7. The procedure or standards for preventing violations of finance-related statutes by executive 
officers and employees (including the procedure or standards for preventing unfair conduct, 
including the reporting of details of transactions of financial investment products by 
executive officers and employees); 
8. The procedure for establishing or amending the internal control standards; 
9. The procedure for appointing or dismissing compliance officers; 
10. The method, procedure, etc. for managing conflicts of interest (not applicable to cases where 
the relevant finance company is a financial holding company); 
11. Rules on the production of advertisements of products or services and the contents of such 
advertisements; 
12. Evaluation and management of concurrent office of executive officers and employees under 
Article 11 (1) of the Act to ascertain whether the criteria under Article 11 (4) 4 are met; 
13. Other matters specified and publicly notified by the Financial Services Commission as those 
that shall be prescribed in detail by the internal control standards. 
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3. Compliance Assistant of Commercial Act 
Public companies which have more than five billion won assets shall establish 
compliance guidelines, and shall have at least one compliance assistant under the 
Commercial Act in Korea. 86  Also, a compliance assistant shall check whether the 
compliance guidelines is being followed and if the outcomes are being reported to the board 
of directors.87 
As reviewed above, the three components of Korea’s internal control systems are 
① the internal accounting control system of the External Audit Act, ② compliance officer 
of Financial Company Governance Act, and ③ compliance assistant of the Commercial 
Act. As a result, in the case of financial companies, the combination of ① and ②, and in 
the case of public companies whose assets are more than 5 billion won, ① and ③ are 
combined as internal control systems. However, public companies which are not financial 
companies, could be concerned about the gap in internal control because the compliance 
officer in the Commercial Act lacks the general concept of internal control and risk 
management.88 
 
                                           
86 Sangbeob [Commercial Act], Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962, amended by Act. No. 13523, Dec. 1, 2015, 
art. 542-13(1) (S. Kor.).   
87 Id. art. 542-13(3). 
88 Kwon, supra note 70, at 142. 
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B. Problems of Legislations related to Internal Control 
1. Omission of general Provision for Internal Control in Commercial Act 
Legal professional groups including the legislature have recognized the 
importance of internal control system, and the systems have been extended from private to 
public legislations in the U.S. The internal control system should have been introduced 
from the perspective of Strategic Risk Management in Korea. However, it can be evaluated 
that Korea has introduced internal control systems through importing individual U.S. laws, 
without comprehensive review of the systems.89 
 As a result, there are no a general provision for internal control system in the 
Commercial Act although the act adopted the compliance officer clauses. This is different 
from the legal system of Japan and the U.S. In Japan, the Corporate law (general law) 
overly governs the internal control systems and the Financial Instruments and Exchange 
Act90 (special law) only regulates financial accounting controls. On the other hand, in the 
U.S., the internal controls mainly focus on accounting controls, but the legislations contain 
comprehensive internal control concepts of COSO reports.91  
 It can be a legislative mistake that there is a no general clause for the internal control 
in Commercial law as a general law, emphasizing the importance of the internal control 
                                           
89 Chung, supra note 71, at 291. 
90 The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (金融商品取引法 Kin'yū shōhin torihiki-hō), promulgated 
on June 14, 2006, is the main statute codifying securities law and regulating securities companies in Japan. 
91 Yook, supra note 22, 167-9. 
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system of public companies.92 Also, it is desirable that directors of companies should be 
liable to establish the internal control system, regardless of being public companies like the 
Stone case. 93  All directors should bear the responsibility to establish internal control 
systems although the content of internal control might vary depending on the size and 
circumstances of the company.94 In order to do so, it is appropriate that a general provision 
for internal control system should be created in the Commercial Act through the revision 
of act.  
 
2. Problems of Cost for Establishing Internal Control System 
 It is substantially impossible for management to grasp every works of employees 
because functions of large-scale firms are highly specialized and complicated. For these 
companies, it is also impossible for executive officers to conduct surveillance tasks without 
effective internal control systems. For this reason, it can be said that director’s liability for 
                                           
92 Chung, supra note 29, at 288. 
93 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Da68636, Sept. 11, 2008 (S. Kor.). Korea Supreme Court benchmarked the 
judgment of the Caremark case and the Stone case of the U.S. The Court decided that if the company has 
established a rational internal control system, and operated it properly, the liability of the representative of 
the company could be reduced. 
94 The directors bear the duties of care, and loyalty by the delegation contract of the company under the 
Commercial Act Article 382-3 in Korea. Directors are obliged to maintain an internal control system as a 
duty of care, and have discretion to design the internal control system depending on the size of the company 
and type of business. 
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internal control is legislated. 
 The establishment of internal control related to cost. The cost problem is closely 
connected to ① which company should establish internal control system under the relevant 
law, ② how to concretely regulate companies for internal control implementation.95 For 
example, a public company which has more than 500 billion won shall have at least one 
compliance assistant. However, many listed companies do not have compliance supporters. 
82 (approximately 40%) out of 304 companies were found not to appoint a compliance 
assistant according to a survey on compliance assistant retention in April 2015.96 The 
reason is that there is no incentive for companies considering cost. Also, it can be 
interpreted as the companies not wanting to retain compliance assistants because there is 
no sanction provision on violation of the duty in the Commercial Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
95 Kwon, supra note 70, at 144. 
 
96 Kang, Euntae, sangjangsa 88gae, junbeobjiwon-in seon-im-uimu wiban [88 listed companies violate the 
commercial law provisions that the listed companies shall have one or more compliance assistants], NSP 
NEWS AGENCY, May 6, 2015, available at http://www.nspna.com/news/?mode=view&newsid=124188 (last 
visited on Nov. 8, 2017).  Considering the burden of the companies, the standard of the listed of companies 
was more than one trillion won in 2012, the criteria has been expanded to more than 500 billion since 2014. 
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Table 5. THE RATIO OF COMPLIANCE ASSISTANT RETENTION IN THE LISTED 
COMPANIES97 
(UNIT: THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES, WON- KOREAN CURRENCY UNIT) 
 
Survey 
Date 
 
The Number of 
listed Companies 
Answer  
Unanswered Compliance 
Assistant 
No Compliance 
 Assistant 
 
April, 2012 
172 
(More than 
 1 Trillion Won) 
69 
(60%) 
46 
(40%) 
57 
(33.2%) 
    
   April, 2014 
306 
(More than 
500 Billion Won) 
108 
(49.5%) 
110 
(50.5%) 
88 
(28.8%) 
 
April, 2015 
304 
(More than 
500 Billion Won) 
123 
(60%) 
82 
(40%) 
99 
(32.5%) 
 
 The following problem is how much to regulate public companies for the internal 
control implementation. In relationship to this problem, there are two different arguments. 
One opinion is that only basic things are needed, and public companies should have 
autonomy to decide. The other opinion is that specific standards are needed.98 As we have 
                                           
97 Id. If 1 U.S. dollar can be converted to 1,115 won (Korean currency unit), 1 trillion won is approximately 
$ 896,860,986, and 500 billion is about $ 448,430,493.  
98  Choi, Joon-sun & Kim, Jung-ho, Naebutongjejedo mich naebuhoegyegwanlijedoui jeongbibang-an 
tolonhoe [Debate on the Improvement of Internal Control System and Internal Accounting Management 
System], 16 PUBLIC COMPANY CFO FORUM NEWSLETTER, 7 (Dec. 2010). 
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seen (Table 4), in the case of financial companies, the 13 matters are prescribed to be 
included in internal control standard under the relevant law. It is believed that individual 
companies will not be able to flexibly operate internal control systems, and it will 
eventually return to the burden of the firms since it is too specific. 
 
3. Conflict Problems of Internal Control System 
ⅰ. Problems for Distinction between Compliance Officer and Compliance Assistant 
It is a problem of distinction between the compliance officer who should be 
appointed by financial companies and the compliance assistant in public companies under 
the Commercial Act.  It is distinguishable that duties of compliance assistant are limited to 
the legal risks of public companies while the responsibilities of compliance officer affect 
entirely the risk of financial companies. It, however, is substantially hard to distinguish 
between the two agencies’ duties because a duty of compliance officer checking whether 
executive officers and employees observe the internal control standards, has nature of 
compliance control.  
Also, the legislature should consider the burden and efficiency of the companies 
in the internal control legislations. For example, if a financial company which has already 
a compliance officer meets the criteria of a company with more than 5 billion won assets, 
the company must retain at least one compliance assistant additionally. In this case, legal 
considerations are needed. It is necessary to clarify the obligations of the compliance 
officer and the compliance assistant, and reasonably explain why a separate system should 
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be established. 
 
ⅱ. Reporting Obligation Issues 
 In principle, a compliance officer of the Commercial Act should check compliance 
with the compliance standards of public companies, and report the results to the board of 
directors. I, however, do not think that compliance officer should report to only the board 
of directors.99 In some case, it may be necessary to report to the Audit Committee first. 
 In comparison, although a compliance officer of financial companies should report 
to the Audit Committee under the Financial Company Governance Act, 100  it is not 
necessary to limit the reporting duty of the officer to the Audit Committee. It is necessary 
to flexibly regulate the reporting duties of compliance officers and compliance 
assistants.101  
 
Ⅳ. Suggestion for the legislation of internal control system in Korea 
A. Need of General Provision for Internal Control in Commercial Act 
 A general provision for internal control system should be created in the Commercial 
                                           
99 Sangbeob [Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-13(3) (S. Kor.).   
100  Geumyunghoesaui Jibaegujo-e Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies], supra note 86, art 25 (S. Kor.). 
 
101 Chung, supra note 71, at 291. 
- 42 - 
 
Act.102 This is because the internal control concept of public companies which is not 
financial companies, is limited to compliance functions. The concept of risk management 
should be introduced to public companies’ business areas by making a comprehensive 
internal concept in the Commercial Act. It is necessary to apply strict internal standards to 
financial companies, taking into consideration the public interest and publicity of financial 
companies in the Financial Company Governance Act of public companies. The internal 
control regulations of the Commercial Act (general law) and the Financial Company 
Governance Act (special law) should be reasonably adjusted. 
 Additionally, the internal control legislations of Korea can be determined to be very 
unique compared to the U.S. and Japan. First, provisions of the special law, the Financial 
Company Governance Act, related to compliance officer comprehensively define internal 
controls, which include compliance and business area. Next, the duty of compliance 
assistant provisions of general law, the Commercial Act, are restricted to the compliance 
area only. 
 In the U.S., although the SOX mainly focuses on accounting controls, the act adopts 
a comprehensive idea of the internal concept. The SOX defines the three areas of 
accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. In this sense, the SOX itself is a legislation 
covering all elements of the COSO internal control concept as a general law for public 
companies. Also, in Japan, the Corporate law has a provision to regulate all internal control 
                                           
102 Kwon, supra note 70, at 143. 
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areas as a general law, 103  and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act mainly 
prescribes accounting control.104 
 
B. Minimization of Internal Control Costs 
 As discussed previously, the cost of establishing internal control is related to how 
much regulation is burdened to companies which are applicable to the act. If the 
Commercial Act has a general provision for internal control, it is reasonable that the 
provision should be applied to public companies that have assets of more than 2 trillion 
won, and have a board of directors based on outside directors. Companies who have more 
than total assets of 2 trillion won should appoint at least three outside directors, and the 
outside directors should account for more than half of the total number of directors under 
the Commercial Act.105 The companies who have outside board of directors are most likely 
to be weak because outside directors are not familiar with company business. Therefore, 
the companies who are have outside directors should establish internal control system to 
                                           
103 Id. at 136. In the Corporate Act of Japan, the obligation of directors for internal control establishment is 
to concrete the duty of care of directors. The purpose of the provision is not limited to securing the reliability 
of accounting reports, but includes the effectiveness, efficiency, legal compliance, and asset protection of the 
entire business. 
 
104 Id. at 135. The purpose of the Financial Product Act of Japan is for internal controls related to corporate 
accounting statements to ensure the reliability and transparency of the accounting. In other words, the listed 
companies should establish internal control systems related to accounting reports, submit reports evaluating 
the internal control to the prime minister, and let Certified Public Accountants certify the reports.   
105  Sangbeob [The Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-8(1) (S. Kor.); Sangbeobsihaenglyeong 
[Enforcement Decree of The Commercial Act], Presidential Decree No. 11485, Aug. 16, 1984, amended by 
Presidential Decree No. 28211, July 26, 2017 art. 34(2). "Listed companies determined by Presidential 
Decree" in the provision to Article 542-8 (1) of the Act means listed companies with total assets valued at 
two trillion won or more as at the end of the latest business year. 
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fix this problem.106 
 The following is a problem of how specifically internal control provision should be 
prescribed. In this regard, it is necessary to consult cases of the SOX. Particularly, there 
have been claims that the internal control regulations became a burden to small-sized public 
companies. It has been said that the U.S. stock market lost their competitiveness as the 
companies go to foreign stock markets. The SOX is basically a system in which the 
management evaluates financial statements including internal control system, and then 
external auditors attest the reports. 
 At first, the methods of evaluating the internal control were different depending on 
the management or situations of public companies, which has been a reason for causing a 
cost increase. Therefore, new auditing standards of the PCAOB have been announced, and 
practical procedures for the SOX have been continuously improved.107 
 Considering this point, it is desirable to implement the internal control system as 
legislations. However, laws should take into consideration the burden of companies, and 
allow flexibility to operate the systems depending on the conditions of firms. 
 
C. The Necessity of Indirect Enforcement of Internal Control System 
 There are direct and indirect enforcement methods in relation to the application of 
                                           
106 Kwon, supra note 70, at 144.  
107 Id. at 146. 
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the internal control system. Direct enforcement is a method of establishing standards for 
the listed companies, and forcing the companies to establish the internal control systems. 
Indirect enforcement suggests basic standards, and let the management evaluate their 
internal control activities, and have the companies disclose the results as reports.108 
 In relation to internal control, there are two things to consider. First, even if the 
management do not establish internal control systems, that is not a management 
responsibility, internal control is not the only mean of ensuring the effectiveness and 
efficiency of business. Next, internal control is not a system that can be applied to all 
companies regardless of the size and type of the firm. It is necessary for companies to 
operate flexibly in consideration of the size and type of companies because internal control 
is also related to corporate governance.109 
 Considering these points, the indirect enforcement method is more reasonable. This 
is an effective way, which allows companies to consider the situation they are facing, and 
they are more flexible on the contents of internal control like the SOX in the U.S. and the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in Japan.110 It is necessary that the government 
                                           
108 Id. at 147. 
109  Yook, supra note 25, at 374. (stating that the Corporate Governance includes the Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERP), and the ERP contains internal control system).; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of 
Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237, 251 (1997). Additionally, “the board has an 
important role to play in the design and administration of the internal control structure.” 
110 Id. at 137. The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in Japan does not directly impose an obligation 
on management to establish internal control. It only forces the management to evaluate the validity of internal 
control, disclose it, and assume accountability to the investors. This is an indirect regulatory approach, and 
even if the management does not establish internal control, it does not in itself violate the Financial 
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suggests general guidelines for internal control, and the companies select their models to 
flexibly pursue their values depending on the situations of firms like SOX in the U.S.  
 
D. Unification of Internal Control System 
1. Unification of Compliance Assistant and Compliance Officer 
 Although compliance assistants for public companies and Compliance officers for 
Financial Companies have different terminology, the duties of organs are overlapped, and 
substantially is the same system.111 Therefore, since compliance assistant and compliance 
officer are merely a list of the same system, there is a need to unify terms and operate the 
system efficiently.112 For example, in the case of a financial company which has more than 
500 billion assets, the company should have at least one compliance assistant besides a 
compliance officer. In this case, it is necessary for a company to have its discretion to select 
one system between a compliance assistant and a compliance officer by the legislation, in 
consideration of the burden of the firm. 
 
                                           
Instruments and Exchange Act, as long as the management submits the internal control reports. 
111 Song, YangHo, Junbeobgamsiingwa junbeobjiwon-in-ui tong-ilseong pil-yo [A Study on the Necessity 
of Unification between Compliance Officer under the Financial-related Laws and Compliance Officer 
under the Commercial Code”, 39 CHONBUK L. REV. 153, 175 (Sep. 2013). 
112 Id. 
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2. Work Area Adjustment of Audit Committee and Compliance Officer 
 According to the general corporation law, South Korea Commercial Act Article 
412 (1), auditors shall audit directors’ performance of duties and this provision shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to the audit committee.113 Also, financial company shall have at least one 
compliance officer who conducts inspections on compliance with internal control standards 
and who plays a role as a risk manager under the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies Article 25 and 28.114 Accordingly, while audit committee or auditors basically 
                                           
113 Sangbeob [Commercial Act], supra note 86 art. 412, 415-2 (S. Kor.).  
Article 412 (Auditors' Duties and Power to Demand Reporting and to Inspect) 
(1) Auditors shall audit directors' performance of duties. 
(2) Auditors may, at any time, request a director to report on the relevant business and may inspect 
the business affairs and financial conditions of a company. 
(3) Auditors may seek assistance from professionals at the expense of the company.  
 
114 Geumyunghoesaui Jibaegujo-e Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies], 
supra note 81, art 25, 28 (S. Kor.).  
  Article 25 (Appointment, Dismissal, etc. of Compliance Officers) (1) Every financial company 
(excluding the investment advisory business entities and discretionary investment business entities 
specified by Presidential Decree, taking the size of assets, etc. into consideration) shall have at 
least one person who shall conduct inspections on compliance with internal control standards, 
investigate violations of internal control standards, and take charge of general affairs related to 
internal control (hereafter referred to as "compliance officer“), and the compliance officer may 
report results of investigation to the audit committee or auditor, if he/she finds it necessary. 
(2) Every financial company shall appoint compliance officers, from among inside directors or 
operating officers: Provided, that a financial company or a domestic branch of a foreign financial 
company, specified by Presidential Decree in consideration of the size of assets, the financial 
business in which it engages, etc., may appoint compliance officers, from among employees who 
are neither inside directors nor operating officers. 
(3) When a financial company (excluding domestic branches of foreign financial companies) 
intends to appoint or dismiss a compliance officer, it shall obtain a resolution thereon from the 
board of directors, and a resolution on dismissal shall be passed with concurrent votes of at least 
two-thirds of all directors. 
(4) The term of office of a compliance officer shall be at least two years. 
(5) Where a financial company appoints a compliance officer, from among its employees under 
the proviso to paragraph (2), it shall not appoint a fixed-term or part-time worker under the Act 
on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Workers as a compliance officer. 
(6) Every financial company shall formulate and implement separate standards for remuneration 
for compliance officers and evaluation of compliance officers, which shall not be linked to 
financial business performance of the company. 
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can be organs which keep a close watch on fraudulent acts like embezzlement and breach 
of trust, compliance officers have duties to prevent violation of law in advance through 
employee training and education. However, there is no substantial difference between the 
two duties of them from a business perspective.  
This problem can cause confusion and inefficacy while two organs are performing their 
duties within the organization. To reduce business confusion and burden of cost, it is 
reasonable that audit committee and internal auditors should streamline their organization’s 
operation. In detail, Board of directors should establish internal control standards and 
appoint compliance officer. Appointed compliance officer’s duties should be limited to 
checking matters prescribed in internal control standards, and accounting inspection 
authority should be given to audit committee. Audit committee, a subcommittee of board, 
should hear reports about compliance matters from financial officer and ultimately have a 
right to decide for only matters containing certain problems. 115  It will guarantee 
compliance officer’s expertise because compliance officers can concentrate on compliance 
duties. Audit committee can recognize compliance officers as assisting organs, and it can 
                                           
  Article 28 (Appointment, Dismissal, etc. of Risk Managers)(1) Every financial company (excluding 
investment advisory business entities and discretionary investment business entities specified by 
Presidential Decree, taking into consideration the size of assets, the business in which the financial 
company engages, etc.) shall have at least one risk manager who shall take charge of examining 
and managing risks incurred in the course of managing assets, performing business affairs, and 
other various transactions. 
 
115 Sur, Ji-min & Choi, Joon-sun, Naebutongjae-e Gwanhan Sogo – Geumyunggigwanui Naebutongjae-
reul Jungsim-euro [A Study on the Internal Control System – Focused on financial institution’s internal 
control system], 22 SUNGKYUNKWAN L. REV. 865 (Dec. 2010) 
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be anticipated for them to create synergy effect through cooperation.116 
 
E. Improvement of Incentive System 
 Internal control is very important system for corporate governance. There, 
however, is no optimal corporate governance for all companies, regardless of type of 
business or size of companies. In that sense, internal control system needs to be more 
flexible with companies when choosing their system depending on the business situations, 
and it is necessary to encourage more companies to establish a system. It requires an 
incentive system that exempts or reduce the responsibilities of the management if the 
companies faithfully abide by guidelines of internal control. 
 The Commercial Act also has had an incentive system provision related to the 
establishment of internal control. If the public companies are punished by a fine for 
transactions with interested persons including major shareholders, directors, and 
auditors, 117  and the companies faithfully perform the duty related to internal control 
system, the firms are exempted from penalties.118 This incentive provision, is limited in 
that it can only apply to specific companies ‘transacts with interested persons’, and is 
‘punished by a fine as a joint penalty’. For the positive effect of the incentive system, it is 
necessary to establish a provision to exempt the liability of the companies irrespective of 
                                           
116 Id at 866. 
117 Sangbeob [The Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-9(1) (S. Kor.) 
118 Id. at art. 634-3 
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the type of the offensive behaviors, like a U.S. Sentencing guideline.119 
Ⅴ. Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study is to provide implication for legislation on the internal 
control system in Korea, reviewing the formation and development of the concept of 
internal control in the U.S. The concept of internal control began in accounting professional 
groups, gradually expanded to the administrative control and the risk management from 
accounting control, and became an important area that cannot be excluded from the 
operation of the public companies in the U.S.  
 When the Enron scandal struck the credibility of the stock market in the U.S. in 
2001, the authorities implemented reformative measures including the SOX enactment to 
protect investors. Although there has been a controversy over this legislation since the 
enactment of the SOX, it appears that the U.S. capital market has been restoring confidence 
with the efforts of regulators. 
 Also, when the foreign exchange crisis and large-scale corporate accounting frauds 
occurred in Korea, there were demands that companies should establish internal control 
systems through legislations. However, the authorities in Korea tried to solve the problem 
by importing internal control system mainly from the U.S. and Japan since there was no 
various discussions of internal control for a long time. As a result, Korea individual 
legislations separately imported the internal control provisions from the U.S. and Japan, 
                                           
119 Kwon, supra note 70, at 147. 
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and they have contained illogical and cost increase problems. The most fundamental 
problem is that it is difficult to apply extensive concept of internal control like risk 
management to public companies that are not financial companies, because there is no 
general provision related the internal control in the Commercial Act, a general act for 
public companies. Next, cost problem companies are neglected to establish the internal 
control. Last, that is a conflict problem of internal control provisions in Korea legislations. 
 To solve these legislative problems, a general provision on internal control should 
be created in the Commercial Act. Second, it is necessary to approach companies with 
indirect regulation method like the U.S. and Japan to minimize the cost of establishment. 
Finally, it is required to integrate and operate internal control agencies that possibly cause 
confusion. Also, it is necessary to encourage companies to participate in establishing 
internal control system by implementing proper incentive systems rather than only 
imposing regulation. 
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